Answers to Questions Asked During the
Study Period Will be Posted Here.
Question One
I've been going over the
use of the Lemon Test and the Endorsement Test in several fact
situations and it seems to me that the Endorsement Test is the same
thing except with a different name. I was wondering, did we
go over any cases that used the Lemon Test
that, in your opinion, would have come out differently if the
Endorsement Test had been used (or vice versa). Or, can you give
an example of a case where certain facts that didn't matter all that
much under the Lemon Test would have mattered more under the
Endorsement Test (or vice versa)?
Answer
I share your suspicion that the two tests are very similar when
applied. My instinct is that the cases come out the same under
the two tests, but that may be in part because both tests can be
manipulated to reach any desired result. One interesting example
is found in Lynch v. Donnelly
(page 438), the case in which Justice O'Connor first announced the
endorsement test in a concurring opinion. In that opinion, she
voted to upheld the display using the endorsement test, while 4 members
of the Court writing in dissent found the display unconstitutional
applying the Lemon
test. The problem, however, is that 4 members in the majority
also used Lemon, but to
uphold rather than strike down the display. That means that 8
judges used the Lemon test,
but they split 4-4 in the result they reached in the case. That
split result makes it seem as though it isn't the test that matters as
much as the attitude of the judge applying the test. Of the two
prongs of the endorsement test (purpose to endorse religion and effect
of endorsing religion), I used to think that the endorsement inquiry
narrowed the purpose prong more than it narrowed the effect prong
because having a secular purpose seemed harder to satisfy than not
having a purpose of endorsing religion. More recently, it has
seemed more likely to make a difference with the effect prong, but only
because of all the knowledge imputed to the knowledgeable
observer. All of that same knowledge wouldn't be considered under
the effect prong so it might be harder to satisfy. That may
explain the disagreement among the Justices who use the endorsement
test over how much specific knowledge the reasonable observer
has. My bottom line is that it probably doesn't matter which test
is used, but that hasn't stopped lower courts from applying both tests
just to cover all their bases. On the exam, of course, it make sense to
apply both tests alternatively even if the analysis under both is
similar.