Mathews v. Eldridge, 424
U.S. 319 (1976)
These decisions underscore the truism that "‘[d]ue process,' unlike
some legal rules, is not a technical conception with a fixed content
unrelated to time, place and circumstances." Cafeteria Workers v.
McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961). "[D]ue process is flexible, and
calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation
demands." Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972). Accordingly,
resolution of the issue whether the administrative procedures provided
here are constitutionally sufficient requires analysis of the
governmental and private interests that are affected. More precisely,
our prior decisions indicate that identification
of the specific dictates of due process generally requires
consideration of three distinct factors: first, the private interest
that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an
erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and
the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural
safeguards; and, finally, the Government's interest, including the
function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the
additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.