Questions to be answered in advance of class:
1. What is a writ of mandamus?
2. What federal statute grants the U.S. Supreme Court the power to
issue a writ of mandamus?
3. The Supreme Court finds that the statute granting the power to issue
a writ of mandamus violates the U.S. Constitution. What language in the
U.S. Constitution does the Court conclude is in conflict with the
statutory grant of power to issue a writ of mandamus?
1. What provision in the U.S. Constitution does Johnson argue is being
violated by the California Department of Corrections?
2. What standard does Johnson want the Supreme Court to use to evaluate
the prison reception center cell assignment policy?
3. What standard does the government want the Court to use to evaluate
the prison reception center cell assignment policy?
4. What are the differences between the two standards?
1. In McCulloch v. Maryland, Maryland argues that the U.S. Constitution
does not grant the federal government the power to charter a bank. Does
Maryland argue that the Constitution specifically prohibits the federal
government from chartering a bank?
2. Does Maryland rely on specific language in the Constitution to
support its argument? If not, what is the basis for the state’s
3. McCulloch, on behalf of the federal government, argues that the U.S.
Constitution grants the federal government the power to charter a
bank. Does McCulloch argue that the Constitution specifically
authorizes the federal government to charter a bank?
4. Does McCulloch rely on specific language in the Constitution to
support his argument? If not, what is the basis for McCulloch’s
5. What are Congress’s enumerated powers?
6. What are Congress’s implied powers?
7. Does the Supreme Court conclude that the text of the U.S.
Constitution provide a clear answer to the
question presented in the case?
8. How does the Court resolve the issue presented if the text does not
provide a clear answer?
1. What is the source of Ogden's authority to operate a steamboat in
the waters between New York and New Jersey?
2. What is the source of Gibbons' authority to operate a steamboat in
the waters between New York and New Jersey?
3. In arguing that his license is valid, does Gibbons rely on an
enumerated power in Article I, Section 8 or an implied power?
4. In United States v. E.C. Knight Co., why does Chief Justice Fuller
conclude that manufacturing is not part of commerce?
5. In Houston E. & W. T. Ry. Co. v. United States, why can Congress
regulate intrastate rail rates based on its power to regulate
6. In Champion v. Ames, does the Supreme Court conclude that Congress
enacted the Federal Lottery Act of 1895 to achieve an economic
7. What constitutional provision does Chief Justice Fuller rely on in
his dissenting opinion in Champion v. Ames?
8. In Hammer v. Dagenhart, how does the Court distinguish earlier cases
upholding Congressional power to prohibit the shipment of various goods
in interstate commerce?
1. In NLRB v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corp., the Court upholds the
constitutionality of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). Does the
NLRA regulate interstate commerce directly or does it regulate local
activity that has an effect on interstate commerce?
2. Does the NLRA attempt to regulate all unfair labor practices?
3. What test does the Court use to decide if the NLRA is constitutional?
4. What two mechanisms does the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) use to
regulate wages and hours?
5. What prior decision does the Court overturn to uphold the
prohibition on the shipment of goods in Section 15(a)(1) of the FLSA?
6. In Wickard v. Filburn, Filburn accepts the fact that Congress can
regulate the amount of wheat he grows for sale, but challenges the
limit on the amount of wheat he grows for home consumption. What
standard does the Court use to uphold Congressional power to limit the
amount of wheat Filburn can grow?
7. In challenging the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Heart of Atlanta
Motel argues that Congress is not allowed to use its commerce power to
achieve moral objectives. How does the Court respond to that argument?
8. In what ways does the Court show deference to Congress in both Heart
of Atlanta Motel and Katzenbach v. McClung?
9. In Perez v. United States, the Court says that "[Perez] is clearly a
member of the class which engages in 'extortionate credit
transactions.' Does looking at Perez as a member of a class expand
Congress's power to regulate local activities utilizing the Commerce
1. In United States v. Lopez, what are the 3 categories of activity
that Congress can regulate under its commerce power?
2. In Lopez, how does the Court distinguish prior cases such as
Wickard, Perez, and Heart of Atlanta Motel?
3. What is a jurisdictional element?
4. How does the Court distinguish between commercial and noncommercial
5. Under what circumstances can Congress regulate a noncommercial
6. After Morrison, can Congress ever rely on the aggregate effects of
local activity to justify the exercise of its commerce power?
7. After Gonzalez v. Raich, when can Congress rely on the "class of
activities" rationale to justify regulation of noncommercial activities?
8. What difference does it make in analyzing a commerce power challenge
if Congress enacts a comprehensive regulatory framework as compared to
a single subject statute?
1. Under the Commerce Clause, does Congress have the power to extend
the provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) to the states as
2. In National League of Cities v. Usery, the Supreme Court strikes
down the extension of the Fair Labor Standards Act to the states as
employers on the ground that the law "impermissibly interfere[s] with
the integral governmental functions." In what way does the law have
such an effect?
3. In Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, the Court
overturns its decision in National League of Cities and thereby permits
Congress to extend the FLSA to the states as employers. Why does the
Court decide to reject its reasoning in National League of Cities?
4. In National League of Cities and Garcia, Congress was regulating the
behavior of states in their role as employers. When Congress enacted
the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985
challenged in New York v. United States, in what state role was
Congress regulating the behavior of states?
5. After the decision in New York v. United States, in what ways can
Congress encourage or require the states to provide for the disposal of
low-level radioactive wastes?
6. In Printz v. United States, what were the states required to do?
7. After Printz, if the federal government needs the assistance of the
states and their employees to implement a federal regulatory program,
what can the federal government do to get such assistance?
8. How does the Court distinguish Printz when it upholds the Driver's
Privacy Protection Act of 1994 in Reno v. Condon?
1. In the Child Labor Tax Case, why does the Court distinguish between
a tax and a penality?
2. How does the Court decide if Congress has enacted a tax or a penalty?
3. Are all taxes that the Court characterizes as penalties
4. Is there any way to distinguish the federal occupational tax on
gambling upheld in United States v. Kahriger from the child labor tax
struck down in the Child Labor Tax Case?
5. For what purposes can Congress spend money under its power to tax
6. How does the Court distinguish between an exercise of the spending
power that amounts to coercion or duress and an exercise of the
spending power that creates an inducement or an incentive?
7. In South Dakota v. Dole, what test does the Court use to evaluate
the constitutionality of an exercise of the spending power in which the
receipt of federal funds by the states is subject to a condition that
the states must comply with in order to receive the federal funds?
1. In Wyeth v. Levine, the Court rejects an implied preemption argument
that relies on two types of implied preemption. What two types of
preemption arguments does the Court reject?
2. Why does the Court conclude that Wyeth could have changed
3. In Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, the Supreme Court uses the term
savings clause in finding that an Arizona law is not expressly
preempted by federal Immigration law. What language in the federal law
is described as a savings clause and why?
4. In Arizona v. United States, which provision of S. B. 1070 is struck
down based on field preemption?
5. In Arizona v. United States, which two provisions of S. B. 1070 are
struck down because they are obstacles to the accomplishment of the
6. In Arizona v. United States, the Court refuses to strike down
Section 2(B) of S. B. 1070. Is it possible that the section will be
struck down as unconstitutional at some later point?
1. In National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, in
ruling that the individual mandate exceeds the scope of the commerce
power, does Chief Justice Roberts overturn any previous Commerce Clause
2. How does Chief Justice Roberts distinguish the individual mandate
from the federal program upheld in Wickard v. Filburn?
3. How does the government attempt to distinguish the market for health
insurance from the market for vegetables?
4. The government tries to use the Necessary and Proper Clause to
justify regulating inactivity. Why does Chief Justice Roberts reject
5. Why does Chief Justice Roberts uphold the individual mandate under
the taxing power when Congress called the payment for failing to
purchase health insurance a penalty?
6. How many members of the Court vote to strike down the Medicaid
expansion provision of the Affordable Care Act?
7. In striking down the Medicaid expansion, how does Chief Justice
Roberts distinguish South Dakota v. Dole?
8. In her dissenting opinion, Justice Ginsburg argues that health
insurance is simply a way of paying for health care. How does she use
that argument to uphold the individual mandate under the Commerce
9. In her dissenting opinion, Justice Ginsburg argues that both Wickard
and Raich, like the individual mandate, involved regulating someone now
for activity they will engage in at some time in the future (p.18).
What is the basis for this interpretation of Wickard and Raich?
10. In her dissenting opinion, Justice Ginsburg critizes the
activity/inactivity line drawn by the majority and compares it to which
rejected distinctions (p. 19)?
1. In McCulloch v. Maryland, the Court concluded that the taxing power
was a concurrent power. Even though Congress was granted the power to
tax in the Constitution, that grant did not turn the taxing power into
an exclusively federal power. By contrast, the power to coin money is a
power that lies exclusively with the federal government. Is the power
to regulate interstate commerce an exclusive federal power or a
concurrent power that can be exercised by both the states and the
2. When a state enacts a law that interferes with the operation of a
federal statute enacted by Congress using its authority under the
Commerce Clause, the state law can be struck down under the Supremacy
Clause. When Congress has not enacted any federal law on the subject,
the Supremacy Clause is not applicable. Suppose a state statute
interferes with the free flow of interstate commerce in an area where
Congress has not legislated, what Clause in the Constitution can be
used to strike down the state law?
3. State laws that adversely effect interstate commerce are analyzed in
different ways depending on the exact nature of the law's purpose or
its effect on interstate commerce. In Philadelphia v. New Jersey, does
the state law treat garbage collected outside of New Jersey and garbage
collected inside New Jersey in the same way or in a different way?
4. What is the purpose of the New Jersey law?
5. How does the Court distinguish between the quarantine laws and the
New Jersey law challenged in Philadelphia v. New Jersey?
6. In Maine v. Taylor, what test does the Court apply?
7. In Maine v. Taylor, why was the State allowed to employ means that
discriminated against out-of-state commerce?
8. In Hughes v. Oklahoma, what alternative means were available to the
state to conserve the supply of minnows?
9. In Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, why was the
camp denied the benefits of the property tax exemption?
1. In Dean Milk v. Madison, the law being challenged was a city
ordinance rather than a state statute. Therefore, the law discriminated
against milk pasturized elsewhere in Wisconsin as well as milk
pasturized in other states. Why was the law still vulnerable to a
dormant Commerce Clause challenge when it discriminated against both
in-state and out-of-state commerce rather than singling out
2. In Dean Milk v. Madison, what alternative means were available to
the City of Madison to assure the safety of its milk supply?
3. How does the dissent in C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Clarkstown
distinguish the case from prior cases of discrimination against
4. How does the Court’s opinion in United Haulers Assn. v.
Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Authority distinguish C & A
Carbone, Inc. v. Clarkstown?
5. In South-Central Timber Development, Inc. v. Wunnike, the Court
distinguishes between a state acting as a market participant and a
state acting as a market regulator. Why does the Court draw such a
6. In South-Central Timber Development, Inc. v. Wunnike, why does
Alaska fail to get the benefit of the market participant exception to
the dormant Commerce Clause?
1. In Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, North
Carolina justified its law as a consumer protection measure. What did
the Washington State apple growers and dealers assert was the purpose
of the North Carolina statute?
2. In Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, all
closed containers of apples, whether the apples were grown in North
Carolina or grown in another state and shipped to North Carolina, had
to contain only the applicable U.S. grade on the container. Since
apples grown in North Carolina and apples grown in other states were
treated the same, why does the Court conclude that the North Carolina
law discriminates against interstate commerce?
3. The Hawaii statute in Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias grants an
exemption from the state’s wholesale liquor tax to all okolehao brandy,
whether produced in Hawaii or produced in another state. What
additional fact do you need to know to understand why the Court
concludes that the statute discriminates against out-of-state commerce?
4. What is the Pike balancing test?
5. Does the Pike balancing test favor the challenger in a dormant
Commerce Clause challenge, favor the state, or treat them both the same?
6. Under the Pike balancing test, which side wins if the burdens
imposed on interstate commerce by the law are equal to the safety
benefits achieved by the law?
7. Corporations are protected by the dormant Commerce Clause and can
sue to assert their rights under that Clause. Is a corporation
protected by the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV?
8. The Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV prevents states
from discriminating against out-of-state citizens (nonresidents) in
certain circumstances. The Clause only protects nonresidents against
discrimination when they are seeking to exercise a right that is
fundamental to the promotion of interstate harmony. What is an example
of such a right?
9. The test employed to evaluate challenges under the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of Article IV is described in the second full
paragraph on page 229. What would a state have to demonstrate to
satisfy the elements of the test?
10. In Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper, how does the Court
evaluate whether the discrimination in the state’s rule bears a
substantial relationship to the state’s objective?
1. In Clinton v. New York, in what way did the Line Item Veto Act allow
the President to repeal portions of laws passed by Congress?
2. In Clinton v. New York, what provision in the Constitution did the
Line Item Veto Act violate and why?
3. The term “separation of powers” is not mentioned in the
Constitution. Nevertheless, as can be seen in Bowsher v. Synar, the
Court has interpreted the Constitution as containing separation of
powers limits on federal power. What provisions in the Constitution
explain this interpretation?
4. In Bowsher v. Synar, what functions does the Comptroller
General have to perform under the provisions of the Balanced Budget and
Emergency Deficit Control Act?
5. In Bowsher v. Synar, the Court concludes that Congress has too much
control over the Comptroller General. Why does this control violate the
6. In his dissenting opinion in Bowsher v. Synar, Justice White writes
that, to determine whether a law violates separation of powers, the key
questions is "whether there is a genuine threat of 'encroachment or
aggrandizement of one branch at the expense of the other.'" Why does
Justice White conclude that the Deficit Reduction Act does not have
such a prohibited effect?
7. In Morrison v. Olson, who was challenging the constitutionality of
the independent counsel provisions of the Ethics in Government Act of
1978 and what were the arguments made as to why the law violated
separation of powers?
8. In Morrision v. Olson, did the Court conclude that the executive
branch lost some authority to supervise an executive branch employee
under the Act?
9. If the executive branch was deprived of some of its
assigned powers, why was the Act found to be constitutional?
10. Justice Scalia writes a dissenting opinion in Morrison v. Olsen.
Why does he conclude that the statute violates separation of powers?
1. In Barron v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, what language in
the Bill of Rights does Barron argue applies to the states?
2. In the Slaughter-House Cases, the Court rejected an argument that
the Fourteenth Amendment was violated when Louisiana granted a monopoly
to the Crescent City Live-Stock Landing and Slaughter-House Company
that prevented other individuals and companies from operating
slaughterhouses in the City of New Orleans. In doing so, the Court
interpreted the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and compared the privileges and immunities of citizens of the
United States to the privileges and immunities of citizens of the
States. Does the Court conclude these are the same privileges and
immunities or different privileges and immunities?
3. In the Slaughter-House Cases, the Court is concerned that
interpreting the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment as urged by the butchers would “constitute this court a
perpetual censor upon all legislation of the States.” Why would this be
a consequences of adopting the interpretation urged by the butchers?
4. In Palko v. Connecticut, which provisions of the Bill of Rights did
Palko argue applied to the states?
5. In Justice Cardozo’s opinion in Palko v. Connecticut, what standard
did he use to determine whether a provision of the Bill of Rights was
applicable to the states?
6. In Adamson v. California, the various opinions in the case relied on
different theories of the relationship between the Bill of Rights and
the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause. Which opinion argues that
there is no necessary relationship between the Bill of Rights and the
Due Process Clause and Due Process is to be independently determined?
7. Both Justice Cardozo in Palko v. Connecticut and Justice White in
Duncan v. Louisiana use the word “fundamental” to describe provisions
in the Bill of Rights that are applicable to the states. How do their
views about which rights are fundamental differ?
8. In McDonald v. City of Chicago, the Court decided its first
incorporation case in more than 30 years. In deciding that the Second
Amendment was applicable to the states, Justice Alito announced what
would use to decide whether the Second Amendment was incorporated. What
standard did he employ?
9. In his dissenting opinion in McDonald v. City of Chicago, Justice
Stevens strongly criticizes Justice Alito’s analysis. Does Justice
Stevens disagree with the test used by Justice Alito, how that test is
applied, or both?
10. Justice Breyer also writes a dissenting opinion in McDonald. How do
his reasons for dissenting differ from Justice Stevens' reasons?
1. In Lochner v. New York, what constitutional provision did Lochner
rely on to challenge the constitutionality of the New York law?
2. In Lochner, what form of constitutionally protected liberty did
Lochner claim he had been denied?
3. In Lochner, what reasons did New York assert for enacting a law
limiting the hours of bakery employees?
4. In Lochner, what standard did the Court apply to evaluate the
constitutionality of the New York law?
5. After Lochner, what could New York do to protect the health of
6. In Weaver v. Palmer Bros. Co, why did Pennsylvania outlaw the use of
7. Under the provisions of the Pennsylvania law challenged in Weaver,
when can secondhand material other than shoddy be used as a filling for
mattresses, pillows and upholstered furniture?
8. In Weaver, Justice Holmes dissents just as he did in Lochner. Why
would he uphold the Pennsylvania law challenged in Weaver?
9. In Nebbia, what test does the Court use to evaluate the New York law
and is it the same or a different test than the one used in Lochner?
1. In United States v. Carolene Products, the federal law prohibited
the interstate shipment of “filled milk.” Carolene Products sold
“filled milk” and argued that its economic liberty protected by the
Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause was violated by the restriction on
its commercial activities. In evaluating this claim, does the Court
presume the law is constitutional or unconstitutional?
2. In Carolene Products, why does the law select the presumption it
3. In Williamson v. Lee Optical, the Court concludes that the Oklahoma
law is “a needless, wasteful requirement in many cases.” If that is the
case, why does the Court conclude that it is constitutional?
4. In Griswold v. Connecticut, how would the case have been decided if
the Court applied the same due process standard that it used in
Williamson v. Lee Optical?
5. In Griswold v. Connecticut, Justices Douglas, Goldberg, and Harlan
each write separate opinions in which they agree to review the
Connecticut law using a less deferential standard of review than the
one employed in Williamson v. Lee Optical. Each opinion relies on a
different analysis to reach this conclusion. Justice Douglas relies on
penumbras formed by emanations from specific guarantees in the Bill of
Rights. What does this mean and why does it justify a less deferential
standard of review?
6. What does Justice Goldberg rely on in his opinion to justify his
conclusion that less deference is due to the Connecticut law?
7. What does Justice Harlan rely on in his opinion to justify his
conclusion that less deference is due to the Connecticut
8. Due process rights are often divided into enumerated rights and
unenumerated rights. What does this mean?
9. Is the right to privacy an enumerated right or an unenumerated
1. In Griswold v. Connecticut, the Court recognized a right of privacy
that was rooted in the marital relationship, a relationship that
society has encouraged and respected since long before the Bill of
Rights was ratified. In Eisenstadt v. Baird, contraceptives were
provided to unmarried persons. How does the Court make use of Griswold
to justify its decision in Eisenstadt?
2. In Roe v. Wade, the Court begins its opinion by reviewing the
various opinions in Griswold (Douglas' penumbras, Goldberg's Ninth
Amendment analysis, and Harlan's liberty approach). Which approach does
the Court adopt?
3. In Roe v. Wade, the Court decides that the right of privacy "is
broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to
terminate her pregnancy." Why is that decision placed within the zone
of privacy recognized in Griswold?
4. In Roe v. Wade, what interests does the state assert to justify the
Texas abortion law?
5. In Roe v. Wade, does Justice Blackmun's opinion conclude that the
state's asserted interests are compelling?
6. Compare the Court's explanation in Roe v. Wade for concluding that
the right of privacy includes a woman's decision whether or not to
terminate her pregnancy with the Court's explanation for reaching the
same conclusion in Planned Parenthood v. Casey. Does the Court in Casey
rely on the same explanation as Roe or a different one?
7. In Casey, the Court relies on the undue burden test to analyze
whether a state restriction on abortion is constitutional or not. How
does the Court decide if an abortion restriction imposes an undue
burden or not?
8. Does the undue burden test used in Casey provide more or less
protection for the woman's decision whether or not to terminate her
pregnancy than the test relied on in Roe v. Wade?
1. In Stenberg v. Carhart, the Court struck down a Nebraska law that
banned a particular type of abortion procedure. What provision should
the state have included in the statute to avoid this outcome?
2. In Gonzales v. Carhart, the Court upheld a federal law that banned
the same type of procedure as Nebraska attempted to regulate in
Stenberg v. Carhart. To reach this decision, did the Court overturn its
decision in Stenberg or distinguish the earlier case?
3. The current members of the Supreme Court are deeply divided over the
abortion issue. Some members of the Court would like to overturn Roe v.
Wade in its entirety, some would like to preserve the decision in its
entirety, and some are satisfied with the undue burden approach adopted
in Casey. Which members of the Court fall into each of these three
4. In Zablock v. Redhail, what fundamental right did Redhail argue he
was deprived of?
5. In Moore v. City of East Cleveland, the Court recognizes the right
of the members of an extended family to live together as part of the
zone of privacy protected by substantive due process. Why does the
Court protect this right?
6. In Michael H. v. Gerald D., what is Michael H. challenging?
7. In Michael H., Justices Scalia and Brennan argue about tradition.
What tradition does Justice Scalia rely on? What tradition does Justice
Brennan rely on?
8. In Bowers v. Hardwick, Michael Hardwick challenges the
constitutionality of Georgia's sodomy law claiming that it violates his
fundamental right to privacy protected by the Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process Clause and the Court rejects his argument. Why?
9. In Lawrenece v. Texas, the Court overturns its decision in Bowers v.
10. In her concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor relies on the Equal
Protection Clause and not the Due Process Clause. Why?
1. In Railway Express Agency v. New York, not all business delivery
vehicles are treated the same. Which ones are treated differently and
why are they treated differently?
2. Does the city have any proof that business delivery advertisements
cause accidents? If not, why is it allowed to solve a problem it can't
even prove exists?
3. Assuming some traffic accidents are caused by distracting ads, could
the city reduce traffic
accidents caused by distracting advertisements on business delivery
vehicles in a more effective manner? If it could, why is it allowed to
use the method it has chosen?
4. In New Orleans v. Dukes, what two categories of French Quarter
pushcart food vendors are treated differently and why?
5. In U.S. Dept. of Agriculture v. Moreno, why does the Court strike
down the law?
6. What standard does the Court use to review the constitutionality of
laws that discriminate on the basis of race? Why does it use this
7. In Loving v. Virginia, why does the Court strike down Virginia's ban
on interracial marriage?
8. In Palmore v. Sidoti, did the state legislature create the racial
discrimination challenge by Palmore?
9. In Palmore v. Sidoti, why does the Court overturn the judge's
decision to award custody to the father?
1. In Yick Wo v. Hopkins, what is the basis for the classification
employed in the San Francisco ordinance?
2. In Yick Wo v. Hopkins, how does the challenger try and prove that
the law is being applied in a racially discriminatory manner?
3. In Washington v. Davis, the challengers showed that black applicants
for positions as police officers were four times as likely to fail the
written test as other applicants. Why wasn't this evidence of
discriminatory effect sufficient to show that the use of the test was
unconstitutional racial discrimination in violation of the equal
protection component of the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause?
4. In Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Corp., in addition to
statistical evidence, in what other ways can a challenger try and prove
5. In Grutter v. Bollinger, the Court uses strict scrutiny to analyze
the Michigan Law School's affirmative action program. What compelling
interest does the Court identify?
6. In Grutter v. Bollinger, why is the Law School's admissions program
7. In Grutter v. Bollinger, would the Law School have been permitted to
set aside a specific number of seats in its entering class for
underrepresented minority students?
8. In Gratz v. Bollinger, how did the University of Michigan take race
into account in its undergraduate admissions system?
9. In Gratz v. Bollinger, why does the Court conclude that the
University's undergraduate admissions system violates the Fourteenth
Amendment Equal Protection Clause?
1. In Frontiero v. Richardson, why does Justice Brennan conclude that
classifications based on gender should be analyzed under the same
strict scrutiny standard as applies to racial discrimination?
2. In Craig v. Boren, what standard of review does the Court apply to
3. In Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, how does the School of
Nursing justify its admissions policy?
4. In United States v. Virginia, will VMI have to change its system of
education if it is required to admit women?
1. In Michael M.
v. Superior Court, California's statutory rape law discriminates
against young men and subjects them to criminal punishments that are
not applied to young women. Why does the Court uphold the law despite
the fact that it discriminates based on gender?
2. In Rostker v. Goldberg, would the draft registration system that
required men and not women to register for the draft be constitutional
if women could serve in combat roles in the armed services?
3. In Orr v. Orr, what gender neutral alternatives were available?
4. When the government enacts discriminatory laws that are designed to
benefit women, the Court worries that such laws "carry the inherent
risk of reinforcing stereotypes about the 'proper place' of women and
their need for special protection." Why is the Social Security
provision struck down in Weinberger
v. Weisenfeld an example of such a law?
5. In Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Center, Inc., why does the Court conclude that a
classification scheme that singles out the mentally retarded is not
based on a suspect or quasi-suspect classification?
6. In Massachusetts Board of Retirement v.
Murgia, if age was a suspect or quasi-suspect classification,
would the mandatory retirement law be constitutional?
7. What is the relationship between Department of Agriculture v. Moreno
and Romer v. Evans?