Constitutional Law
Professor Harpaz
Spring, 2013

Questions to be answered in advance of class:

Assignment 1
1. What is a writ of mandamus?
2. What federal statute grants the U.S. Supreme Court the power to issue a writ of mandamus?
3. The Supreme Court finds that the statute granting the power to issue a writ of mandamus violates the U.S. Constitution. What language in the U.S. Constitution does the Court conclude is in conflict with the statutory grant of power to issue a writ of mandamus?

Assignment 2
1. What provision in the U.S. Constitution does Johnson argue is being violated by the California Department of Corrections?
2. What standard does Johnson want the Supreme Court to use to evaluate the prison reception center cell assignment policy?
3. What standard does the government want the Court to use to evaluate the prison reception center cell assignment policy?
4. What are the differences between the two standards?

Assignment 3
1. In McCulloch v. Maryland, Maryland argues that the U.S. Constitution does not grant the federal government the power to charter a bank. Does Maryland argue that the Constitution specifically prohibits the federal government from chartering a bank?
2. Does Maryland rely on specific language in the Constitution to support its argument? If not, what is the basis for the state’s argument?
3. McCulloch, on behalf of the federal government, argues that the U.S. Constitution grants the federal government the power to charter a bank. Does McCulloch argue that the Constitution specifically authorizes the federal government to charter a bank?
4. Does McCulloch rely on specific language in the Constitution to support his argument? If not, what is the basis for McCulloch’s argument?
5. What are Congress’s enumerated powers?
6. What are Congress’s implied powers?
7. Does the Supreme Court conclude that the text of the U.S. Constitution provide a clear answer to the question presented in the case?
8. How does the Court resolve the issue presented if the text does not provide a clear answer?

Assignment 4
1. What is the source of Ogden's authority to operate a steamboat in the waters between New York and New Jersey?
2. What is the source of Gibbons' authority to operate a steamboat in the waters between New York and New Jersey?
3. In arguing that his license is valid, does Gibbons rely on an enumerated power in Article I, Section 8 or an implied power?
4. In United States v. E.C. Knight Co., why does Chief Justice Fuller conclude that manufacturing is not part of commerce?
5. In Houston E. & W. T. Ry. Co. v. United States, why can Congress regulate intrastate rail rates based on its power to regulate interstate commerce?
6. In Champion v. Ames, does the Supreme Court conclude that Congress enacted the Federal Lottery Act of 1895 to achieve an economic objective?
7. What constitutional provision does Chief Justice Fuller rely on in his dissenting opinion in Champion v. Ames?
8. In Hammer v. Dagenhart, how does the Court distinguish earlier cases upholding Congressional power to prohibit the shipment of various goods in interstate commerce?

Assignment 5
1. In NLRB v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corp., the Court upholds the constitutionality of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). Does the NLRA regulate interstate commerce directly or does it regulate local activity that has an effect on interstate commerce?
2. Does the NLRA attempt to regulate all unfair labor practices?
3. What test does the Court use to decide if the NLRA is constitutional?
4. What two mechanisms does the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) use to regulate wages and hours?
5. What prior decision does the Court overturn to uphold the prohibition on the shipment of goods in Section 15(a)(1) of the FLSA?
6. In Wickard v. Filburn, Filburn accepts the fact that Congress can regulate the amount of wheat he grows for sale, but challenges the limit on the amount of wheat he grows for home consumption. What standard does the Court use to uphold Congressional power to limit the amount of wheat Filburn can grow?
7. In challenging the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Heart of Atlanta Motel argues that Congress is not allowed to use its commerce power to achieve moral objectives. How does the Court respond to that argument?
8. In what ways does the Court show deference to Congress in both Heart of Atlanta Motel and Katzenbach v. McClung?
9. In Perez v. United States, the Court says that "[Perez] is clearly a member of the class which engages in 'extortionate credit transactions.' Does looking at Perez as a member of a class expand Congress's power to regulate local activities utilizing the Commerce Clause?

Assignment 6
1. In United States v. Lopez, what are the 3 categories of activity that Congress can regulate under its commerce power?
2. In Lopez, how does the Court distinguish prior cases such as Wickard, Perez, and Heart of Atlanta Motel?
3. What is a jurisdictional element?
4. How does the Court distinguish between commercial and noncommercial intrastate activity?
5. Under what circumstances can Congress regulate a noncommercial intrastate activity?
6. After Morrison, can Congress ever rely on the aggregate effects of local activity to justify the exercise of its commerce power?
7. After Gonzalez v. Raich, when can Congress rely on the "class of activities" rationale to justify regulation of noncommercial activities?
8. What difference does it make in analyzing a commerce power challenge if Congress enacts a comprehensive regulatory framework as compared to a single subject statute?

Assignment 7
1. Under the Commerce Clause, does Congress have the power to extend the provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) to the states as employers?
2. In National League of Cities v. Usery, the Supreme Court strikes down the extension of the Fair Labor Standards Act to the states as employers on the ground that the law "impermissibly interfere[s] with the integral governmental functions." In what way does the law have such an effect?
3. In Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, the Court overturns its decision in National League of Cities and thereby permits Congress to extend the FLSA to the states as employers. Why does the Court decide to reject its reasoning in National League of Cities?
4. In National League of Cities and Garcia, Congress was regulating the behavior of states in their role as employers. When Congress enacted the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985 challenged in New York v. United States, in what state role was Congress regulating the behavior of states?
5. After the decision in New York v. United States, in what ways can Congress encourage or require the states to provide for the disposal of low-level radioactive wastes?
6. In Printz v. United States, what were the states required to do?
7. After Printz, if the federal government needs the assistance of the states and their employees to implement a federal regulatory program, what can the federal government do to get such assistance?
8. How does the Court distinguish Printz when it upholds the Driver's Privacy Protection Act of 1994 in Reno v. Condon?

Assignment 8
1. In the Child Labor Tax Case, why does the Court distinguish between a tax and a penality?
2. How does the Court decide if Congress has enacted a tax or a penalty?
3. Are all taxes that the Court characterizes as penalties unconstitutional?
4. Is there any way to distinguish the federal occupational tax on gambling upheld in United States v. Kahriger from the child labor tax struck down in the Child Labor Tax Case?
5. For what purposes can Congress spend money under its power to tax and spend?
6. How does the Court distinguish between an exercise of the spending power that amounts to coercion or duress and an exercise of the spending power that creates an inducement or an incentive?
7. In South Dakota v. Dole, what test does the Court use to evaluate the constitutionality of an exercise of the spending power in which the receipt of federal funds by the states is subject to a condition that the states must comply with in order to receive the federal funds?

Assignment 9
1. In Wyeth v. Levine, the Court rejects an implied preemption argument that relies on two types of implied preemption. What two types of implied preemption arguments does the Court reject?
2. Why does the Court conclude that Wyeth could have changed  Phenergan's label?
3. In Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, the Supreme Court uses the term savings clause in finding that an Arizona law is not expressly preempted by federal Immigration law. What language in the federal law is described as a savings clause and why?
4. In Arizona v. United States, which provision of S. B. 1070 is struck down based on field preemption?
5. In Arizona v. United States, which two provisions of S. B. 1070 are struck down because they are obstacles to the accomplishment of the Congressional purpose?
6. In Arizona v. United States, the Court refuses to strike down Section 2(B) of S. B. 1070. Is it possible that the section will be struck down as unconstitutional at some later point?

Assignment 10
1. In National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, in ruling that the individual mandate exceeds the scope of the commerce power, does Chief Justice Roberts overturn any previous Commerce Clause decisions?
2. How does Chief Justice Roberts distinguish the individual mandate from the federal program upheld in Wickard v. Filburn?
3. How does the government attempt to distinguish the market for health insurance from the market for vegetables?
4. The government tries to use the Necessary and Proper Clause to justify regulating inactivity. Why does Chief Justice Roberts reject that argument?
5. Why does Chief Justice Roberts uphold the individual mandate under the taxing power when Congress called the payment for failing to purchase health insurance a penalty?
6. How many members of the Court vote to strike down the Medicaid expansion provision of the Affordable Care Act?
7. In striking down the Medicaid expansion, how does Chief Justice Roberts distinguish South Dakota v. Dole?
8. In her dissenting opinion, Justice Ginsburg argues that health insurance is simply a way of paying for health care. How does she use that argument to uphold the individual mandate under the Commerce Clause?
9. In her dissenting opinion, Justice Ginsburg argues that both Wickard and Raich, like the individual mandate, involved regulating someone now for activity they will engage in at some time in the future (p.18). What is the basis for this interpretation of Wickard and Raich?
10. In her dissenting opinion, Justice Ginsburg critizes the activity/inactivity line drawn by the majority and compares it to which rejected distinctions (p. 19)?

Assignment 11
1. In McCulloch v. Maryland, the Court concluded that the taxing power was a concurrent power. Even though Congress was granted the power to tax in the Constitution, that grant did not turn the taxing power into an exclusively federal power. By contrast, the power to coin money is a power that lies exclusively with the federal government. Is the power to regulate interstate commerce an exclusive federal power or a concurrent power that can be exercised by both the states and the federal government?
2. When a state enacts a law that interferes with the operation of a federal statute enacted by Congress using its authority under the Commerce Clause, the state law can be struck down under the Supremacy Clause. When Congress has not enacted any federal law on the subject, the Supremacy Clause is not applicable. Suppose a state statute interferes with the free flow of interstate commerce in an area where Congress has not legislated, what Clause in the Constitution can be used to strike down the state law?
3. State laws that adversely effect interstate commerce are analyzed in different ways depending on the exact nature of the law's purpose or its effect on interstate commerce. In Philadelphia v. New Jersey, does the state law treat garbage collected outside of New Jersey and garbage collected inside New Jersey in the same way or in a different way?
4. What is the purpose of the New Jersey law?
5. How does the Court distinguish between the quarantine laws and the New Jersey law challenged in Philadelphia v. New Jersey?
6. In Maine v. Taylor, what test does the Court apply?
7. In Maine v. Taylor, why was the State allowed to employ means that discriminated against out-of-state commerce?
8. In Hughes v. Oklahoma, what alternative means were available to the state to conserve the supply of minnows?
9. In Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, why was the camp denied the benefits of the property tax exemption?

Assignment 12
1. In Dean Milk v. Madison, the law being challenged was a city ordinance rather than a state statute. Therefore, the law discriminated against milk pasturized elsewhere in Wisconsin as well as milk pasturized in other states. Why was the law still vulnerable to a dormant Commerce Clause challenge when it discriminated against both in-state and out-of-state commerce rather than singling out out-of-state commerce?
2. In Dean Milk v. Madison, what alternative means were available to the City of Madison to assure the safety of its milk supply?
3. How does the dissent in C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Clarkstown distinguish the case from prior cases of discrimination against out-of-state commerce?
4. How does the Court’s opinion in United Haulers Assn. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Authority distinguish C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Clarkstown?
5. In South-Central Timber Development, Inc. v. Wunnike, the Court distinguishes between a state acting as a market participant and a state acting as a market regulator. Why does the Court draw such a distinction?
6. In South-Central Timber Development, Inc. v. Wunnike, why does Alaska fail to get the benefit of the market participant exception to the dormant Commerce Clause?

Assignment 13
1.  In Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, North Carolina justified its law as a consumer protection measure. What did the Washington State apple growers and dealers assert was the purpose of the North Carolina statute?
2. In  Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, all closed containers of apples, whether the apples were grown in North Carolina or grown in another state and shipped to North Carolina, had to contain only the applicable U.S. grade on the container. Since apples grown in North Carolina and apples grown in other states were treated the same, why does the Court conclude that the North Carolina law discriminates against interstate commerce?
3. The Hawaii statute in Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias grants an exemption from the state’s wholesale liquor tax to all okolehao brandy, whether produced in Hawaii or produced in another state. What additional fact do you need to know to understand why the Court concludes that the statute discriminates against out-of-state commerce?
4. What is the Pike balancing test?
5. Does the Pike balancing test favor the challenger in a dormant Commerce Clause challenge, favor the state, or treat them both the same?
6. Under the Pike balancing test, which side wins if the burdens imposed on interstate commerce by the law are equal to the safety benefits achieved by the law?
7. Corporations are protected by the dormant Commerce Clause and can sue to assert their rights under that Clause. Is a corporation protected by the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV?
8. The Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV prevents states from discriminating against out-of-state citizens (nonresidents) in certain circumstances. The Clause only protects nonresidents against discrimination when they are seeking to exercise a right that is fundamental to the promotion of interstate harmony. What is an example of such a right?
9. The test employed to evaluate challenges under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV is described in the second full paragraph on page 229. What would a state have to demonstrate to satisfy the elements of the test?
10. In Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper, how does the Court evaluate whether the discrimination in the state’s rule bears a substantial relationship to the state’s objective?

Assignment 14
1. In Clinton v. New York, in what way did the Line Item Veto Act allow the President to repeal portions of laws passed by Congress?
2. In Clinton v. New York, what provision in the Constitution did the Line Item Veto Act violate and why?
3. The term “separation of powers” is not mentioned in the Constitution. Nevertheless, as can be seen in Bowsher v. Synar, the Court has interpreted the Constitution as containing separation of powers limits on federal power. What provisions in the Constitution explain this interpretation?
4. In Bowsher v. Synar, what  functions does the Comptroller General have to perform under the provisions of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act?
5. In Bowsher v. Synar, the Court concludes that Congress has too much control over the Comptroller General. Why does this control violate the Constitution?
6. In his dissenting opinion in Bowsher v. Synar, Justice White writes that, to determine whether a law violates separation of powers, the key questions is "whether there is a genuine threat of 'encroachment or aggrandizement of one branch at the expense of the other.'" Why does Justice White conclude that the Deficit Reduction Act does not have such a prohibited effect?
7. In Morrison v. Olson, who was challenging the constitutionality of the independent counsel provisions of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 and what were the arguments made as to why the law violated separation of powers?
8. In Morrision v. Olson, did the Court conclude that the executive branch lost some authority to supervise an executive branch employee under the Act?
9. If the executive branch was deprived of some of its constitutionally assigned powers, why was the Act found to be constitutional?
10. Justice Scalia writes a dissenting opinion in Morrison v. Olsen. Why does he conclude that the statute violates separation of powers?

Assignment 15
1. In Barron v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, what language in the Bill of Rights does Barron argue applies to the states?
2. In the Slaughter-House Cases, the Court rejected an argument that the Fourteenth Amendment was violated when Louisiana granted a monopoly to the Crescent City Live-Stock Landing and Slaughter-House Company that prevented other individuals and companies from operating slaughterhouses in the City of New Orleans. In doing so, the Court interpreted the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and compared the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States to the privileges and immunities of citizens of the States. Does the Court conclude these are the same privileges and immunities or different privileges and immunities?
3. In the Slaughter-House Cases, the Court is concerned that interpreting the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as urged by the butchers would “constitute this court a perpetual censor upon all legislation of the States.” Why would this be a consequences of adopting the interpretation urged by the butchers?
4. In Palko v. Connecticut, which provisions of the Bill of Rights did Palko argue applied to the states?
5. In Justice Cardozo’s opinion in Palko v. Connecticut, what standard did he use to determine whether a provision of the Bill of Rights was applicable to the states?
6. In Adamson v. California, the various opinions in the case relied on different theories of the relationship between the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause. Which opinion argues that there is no necessary relationship between the Bill of Rights and the Due Process Clause and Due Process is to be independently determined?
7. Both Justice Cardozo in Palko v. Connecticut and Justice White in Duncan v. Louisiana use the word “fundamental” to describe provisions in the Bill of Rights that are applicable to the states. How do their views about which rights are fundamental differ?
8. In McDonald v. City of Chicago, the Court decided its first incorporation case in more than 30 years. In deciding that the Second Amendment was applicable to the states, Justice Alito announced what standard he would use to decide whether the Second Amendment was incorporated. What standard did he employ?
9. In his dissenting opinion in McDonald v. City of Chicago, Justice Stevens strongly criticizes Justice Alito’s analysis. Does Justice Stevens disagree with the test used by Justice Alito, how that test is applied, or both?
10. Justice Breyer also writes a dissenting opinion in McDonald. How do his reasons for dissenting differ from Justice Stevens' reasons?

Assignment 16
1. In Lochner v. New York, what constitutional provision did Lochner rely on to challenge the constitutionality of the New York law?
2. In Lochner, what form of constitutionally protected liberty did Lochner claim he had been denied?
3. In Lochner, what reasons did New York assert for enacting a law limiting the hours of bakery employees?
4. In Lochner, what standard did the Court apply to evaluate the constitutionality of the New York law?
5. After Lochner, what could New York do to protect the health of bakery employees?
6. In Weaver v. Palmer Bros. Co, why did Pennsylvania outlaw the use of shoddy?
7. Under the provisions of the Pennsylvania law challenged in Weaver, when can secondhand material other than shoddy be used as a filling for mattresses, pillows and upholstered furniture?
8. In Weaver, Justice Holmes dissents just as he did in Lochner. Why would he uphold the Pennsylvania law challenged in Weaver?
9. In Nebbia, what test does the Court use to evaluate the New York law and is it the same or a different test than the one used in Lochner?

Assignment 17
1. In United States v. Carolene Products, the federal law prohibited the interstate shipment of “filled milk.” Carolene Products sold “filled milk” and argued that its economic liberty protected by the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause was violated by the restriction on its commercial activities. In evaluating this claim, does the Court presume the law is constitutional or unconstitutional?
2. In Carolene Products, why does the law select the presumption it relies on?
3. In Williamson v. Lee Optical, the Court concludes that the Oklahoma law is “a needless, wasteful requirement in many cases.” If that is the case, why does the Court conclude that it is constitutional?
4. In Griswold v. Connecticut, how would the case have been decided if the Court applied the same due process standard that it used in Williamson v. Lee Optical?
5. In Griswold v. Connecticut, Justices Douglas, Goldberg, and Harlan each write separate opinions in which they agree to review the Connecticut law using a less deferential standard of review than the one employed in Williamson v. Lee Optical. Each opinion relies on a different analysis to reach this conclusion. Justice Douglas relies on penumbras formed by emanations from specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights. What does this mean and why does it justify a less deferential standard of review?
6. What does Justice Goldberg rely on in his opinion to justify his conclusion that less deference is due to the Connecticut law?
7. What does Justice Harlan rely on in his opinion to justify his conclusion that less deference is due to the Connecticut law?  
8. Due process rights are often divided into enumerated rights and unenumerated rights. What does this mean?
9. Is the right to privacy an enumerated right or an unenumerated right?

Assignment 18
1. In Griswold v. Connecticut, the Court recognized a right of privacy that was rooted in the marital relationship, a relationship that society has encouraged and respected since long before the Bill of Rights was ratified. In Eisenstadt v. Baird, contraceptives were provided to unmarried persons. How does the Court make use of Griswold to justify its decision in Eisenstadt?
2. In Roe v. Wade, the Court begins its opinion by reviewing the various opinions in Griswold (Douglas' penumbras, Goldberg's Ninth Amendment analysis, and Harlan's liberty approach). Which approach does the Court adopt?
3. In Roe v. Wade, the Court decides that the right of privacy "is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy." Why is that decision placed within the zone of privacy recognized in Griswold?
4. In Roe v. Wade, what interests does the state assert to justify the Texas abortion law?
5. In Roe v. Wade, does Justice Blackmun's opinion conclude that the state's asserted interests are compelling?
6. Compare the Court's explanation in Roe v. Wade for concluding that the right of privacy includes a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy with the Court's explanation for reaching the same conclusion in Planned Parenthood v. Casey. Does the Court in Casey rely on the same explanation as Roe or a different one?
7. In Casey, the Court relies on the undue burden test to analyze whether a state restriction on abortion is constitutional or not. How does the Court decide if an abortion restriction imposes an undue burden or not?
8. Does the undue burden test used in Casey provide more or less protection for the woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy than the test relied on in Roe v. Wade?

Assignment 19
1. In Stenberg v. Carhart, the Court struck down a Nebraska law that banned a particular type of abortion procedure. What provision should the state have included in the statute to avoid this outcome?
2. In Gonzales v. Carhart, the Court upheld a federal law that banned the same type of procedure as Nebraska attempted to regulate in Stenberg v. Carhart. To reach this decision, did the Court overturn its decision in Stenberg or distinguish the earlier case?
3. The current members of the Supreme Court are deeply divided over the abortion issue. Some members of the Court would like to overturn Roe v. Wade in its entirety, some would like to preserve the decision in its entirety, and some are satisfied with the undue burden approach adopted in Casey. Which members of the Court fall into each of these three categories?
4. In Zablock v. Redhail, what fundamental right did Redhail argue he was deprived of?
5. In Moore v. City of East Cleveland, the Court recognizes the right of the members of an extended family to live together as part of the zone of privacy protected by substantive due process. Why does the Court protect this right?
6. In Michael H. v. Gerald D., what is Michael H. challenging?
7. In Michael H., Justices Scalia and Brennan argue about tradition. What tradition does Justice Scalia rely on? What tradition does Justice Brennan rely on?
8. In Bowers v. Hardwick, Michael Hardwick challenges the constitutionality of Georgia's sodomy law claiming that it violates his fundamental right to privacy protected by the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause and the Court rejects his argument. Why?
9. In Lawrenece v. Texas, the Court overturns its decision in Bowers v. Hardwick. Why?
10. In her concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor relies on the Equal Protection Clause and not the Due Process Clause. Why?

Assignment 20
1. In Railway Express Agency v. New York, not all business delivery vehicles are treated the same. Which ones are treated differently and why are they treated differently?
2. Does the city have any proof that business delivery advertisements cause accidents? If not, why is it allowed to solve a problem it can't even prove exists?
3. Assuming some traffic accidents are caused by distracting ads, could the city reduce traffic accidents caused by distracting advertisements on business delivery vehicles in a more effective manner? If it could, why is it allowed to use the method it has chosen?
4. In New Orleans v. Dukes, what two categories of French Quarter pushcart food vendors are treated differently and why?
5. In U.S. Dept. of Agriculture v. Moreno, why does the Court strike down the law?
6. What standard does the Court use to review the constitutionality of laws that discriminate on the basis of race? Why does it use this standard?
7. In Loving v. Virginia, why does the Court strike down Virginia's ban on interracial marriage?
8. In Palmore v. Sidoti, did the state legislature create the racial discrimination challenge by Palmore?
9. In Palmore v. Sidoti, why does the Court overturn the judge's decision to award custody to the father?

Assignment 21
1. In Yick Wo v. Hopkins, what is the basis for the classification employed in the San Francisco ordinance?
2. In Yick Wo v. Hopkins, how does the challenger try and prove that the law is being applied in a racially discriminatory manner?
3. In Washington v. Davis, the challengers showed that black applicants for positions as police officers were four times as likely to fail the written test as other applicants. Why wasn't this evidence of discriminatory effect sufficient to show that the use of the test was unconstitutional racial discrimination in violation of the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause?
4. In Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Corp., in addition to statistical evidence, in what other ways can a challenger try and prove discriminatory purpose?
5. In Grutter v. Bollinger, the Court uses strict scrutiny to analyze the Michigan Law School's affirmative action program. What compelling interest does the Court identify?
6. In Grutter v. Bollinger, why is the Law School's admissions program narrowly tailored?
7. In Grutter v. Bollinger, would the Law School have been permitted to set aside a specific number of seats in its entering class for underrepresented minority students?
8. In Gratz v. Bollinger, how did the University of Michigan take race into account in its undergraduate admissions system?
9. In Gratz v. Bollinger, why does the Court conclude that the University's undergraduate admissions system violates the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause?

Assignment 22
1. In Frontiero v. Richardson, why does Justice Brennan conclude that classifications based on gender should be analyzed under the same strict scrutiny standard as applies to racial discrimination?
2. In Craig v. Boren, what standard of review does the Court apply to gender discrimination?
3. In Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, how does the School of Nursing justify its admissions policy?
4. In United States v. Virginia, will VMI have to change its system of education if it is required to admit women?

Assignment 23
1. In Michael M. v. Superior Court, California's statutory rape law discriminates against young men and subjects them to criminal punishments that are not applied to young women. Why does the Court uphold the law despite the fact that it discriminates based on gender?
2. In Rostker v. Goldberg, would the draft registration system that required men and not women to register for the draft be constitutional if women could serve in combat roles in the armed services?
3. In Orr v. Orr, what gender neutral alternatives were available?
4. When the government enacts discriminatory laws that are designed to benefit women, the Court worries that such laws "carry the inherent risk of reinforcing stereotypes about the 'proper place' of women and their need for special protection." Why is the Social Security provision struck down in Weinberger v. Weisenfeld an example of such a law?
5. In Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., why does the Court conclude that a classification scheme that singles out the mentally retarded is not based on a suspect or quasi-suspect classification?
6. In Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia,  if age was a suspect or quasi-suspect classification, would the mandatory retirement law be constitutional?
7. What is the relationship between Department of Agriculture v. Moreno and Romer v. Evans?